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Abstract: Designing business models that take into consideration the role of advertising support 
is critical to the success of online services. In this paper, we address the challenges of these 
business model strategies and compare different ad revenue models. We use game theory to 
model vertical differentiation in both monopoly and duopoly settings, in which online service 
providers may offer an ad-free service, an ad-supported service, or a combination of these 
services. Offering both ad-free and ad-supported services is the optimal strategy for a monopolist, 
because ad revenues compensate for the cannibalistic effect of vertical differentiation. In a 
duopoly equilibrium, exactly one firm offers both services, when the ad revenue rate is 
sufficiently high. Furthermore, we find that a higher ad revenue rate may lead to lower service 
prices. Consistent across both monopoly and duopoly settings, such price reductions are more 
severe in the cost-per-thousand-impressions (CPM) model than in the cost-per-click (CPC) 
model. Our findings emphasize the role of advertising revenues in vertical differentiation and 
offer strategic guidance for monetizing online services.  
Key Words: Vertical differentiation, ad-supported business models, online advertising, game 
theory, economic analysis, e-commerce.  
 
1  Introduction 
 
Content distribution is migrating to online channels, where business model strategies are critical 
for success. For example, Netflix—known for its DVD-by-mail service—has begun to digitize 
films for instant streaming. It offers multiple levels of paid memberships, and its revenue is 
based completely on subscriptions. A newer online service, Hulu, provides television content and 
films on demand. Both the free and paid services offered by Hulu are ad supported, and the 
company reached $263 million in earnings in 2010 [15]. Other examples include Amazon Prime 
and iTunes, both of which have extensive libraries of entertainment content for renting and 
downloading. Among platforms of online games, Pogo.com varies the advertising intensity and 
mixes free and paid memberships, whereas FreeArcade.com offers a single, free service financed 
by ads. Furthermore, for Internet music discovery services, Pandora offers multiple subscription 
levels, with and without ads, whereas a competing service, Jango, relies on a single ad-supported 
service that is free of charge. 
As online services flourish, widely adopted ad-supported business models are leading to 
an inevitable surge in online advertising. According to the Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB), 
online advertising revenues have been growing steadily for the past five consecutive quarters 
[13]. In 2010, advertising revenues on the Internet reached a record high of $26 billion, 
surpassing those for many traditional media, including newspaper, radio, and TV cable networks 
[13]. In this paper, we use game theory to analyze the design of service offerings through 
subscription-based and/or ad-supported business models, under both monopolistic and 
competitive market structures. We also provide a comparison of the effects of different ad 
revenue models on online service providers' pricing and business model decisions. 
Two types of ad revenue model contribute most substantially to online advertising 
revenues: The performance-based model and the cost-per-thousand-impressions (CPM) (i.e., 
cost-per-mille) model. From 2004 to 2008, each of these two models consistently generated 
revenues of more than 40% of the total online advertising revenues [13]. The CPM model has 
commonly been used for many traditional media, such as television and newspaper, and has also 
been adopted for online advertising. Even though highly ad-averse users are unlikely to respond 
to ads, the CPM model charges advertisers according to the level of exposure, regardless of ad 
effectiveness. Performance-based revenue models take into account user ad aversion and charge 
advertisers on the basis of user actions. For example, in cost-per-click (CPC)—a highly 
successful and popular performance-based model—advertisers pay only when their ads generate 
clicks. Performance-based ad revenues surpassed the CPM revenues in 2006 and remain 
increasingly dominant [13]. Our paper offers an economic perspective on different ways the two 
models affect the pricing and demand of online services. 
Aside from the challenges related to service combinations and advertising models, online 
service providers may also face different market forces. Competition is fierce for many types of 
services. For example, Pandora and Jango, along with a number of other online services (e.g., 
iLike, Mog.com, etc.), stream music with socializing and discovery capabilities. They rely 
substantially on advertising revenues and encounter increasing difficulties in monetizing online 
music in a rivalrous landscape. Whereas Netflix, Hulu, Amazon Prime, and iTunes compete in 
online movie rental, Hulu holds the exclusive license to stream current episodes of television 
shows from ABC, Comedy Central, FOX, NBCUniversal, MTV, and more, and has monopoly 
power over the PC and mobile channels. However, it has also struggled with building the user 
base for the recently introduced Hulu Plus subscription service [28]. 
Among the ad-free, ad-supported, and mixed (ad-free and ad-supported) business models, 
we identify the optimal and equilibrium business models in the monopoly and duopoly settings, 
respectively. The monopolist's optimal business model includes both the ad-free and 
ad-supported services. The latter service generates additional ad revenues that compensate for 
the cannibalistic effect of vertical differentiation. The mixed business model allows the 
monopolist to price discriminate and to serve consumers who would otherwise be excluded 
under a single ad-supported service. By fully endogenizing the prices, we find that a paid 
ad-supported service may be sustainable when an ad-free service is available at a higher price. In 
the duopoly equilibrium, exactly one firm may adopt the mixed business model, whereas the 
rival offers only the ad-supported service. Competition then drives down both firms' price for the 
ad-support service, explaining the zero price of ad-supported services in many practical cases. 
This equilibrium requires a sufficiently high ad revenue rate; otherwise, the firm with the mixed 
business model will offer only the ad-free service. Thus, given lower ad revenue rates, 
competing firms can avoid the price war through differentiation. 
By comparing the CPC- and CPM-based ad revenue models, we find that, in both 
monopoly and duopoly settings, the CPC model leads to greater stability in service pricing for all 
business model configurations. The optimal pricing strategy fluctuates with the ad revenue rate. 
A higher ad revenue rate induces online service providers to expand the demand of the 
ad-supported service by cutting price. In the case of the CPM model, this price reduction is 
severe because the marginal revenue gain is independent of consumer ad aversion and 
proportional to the demand. In the CPC model, the service provider gains diminishing marginal 
revenues from pricecuts because the additional consumers captured are more ad averse and less 
effective in generating ad revenues. This intuition applies to all cases studied in our analysis. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We review the related literature in 
the next section. In the third section, we present the model and the analysis of the monopolist's 
optimization problem. We study the duopoly case and derive the equilibrium in the fourth 
section. In the fifth section, we discuss the theoretical and managerial contributions. Finally, in 
the sixth section, we conclude the paper. 
2  Literature Review 
 
Our work is closely related to theories of vertical differentiation. In a monopoly context, Mussa 
and Rosen [21], Moorthy [19], Salant [26], and others examine the optimality of vertical 
differentiation based on different cost structures and consumer heterogeneity. These studies 
explore whether offering additional lower-quality options induces unfavorable competition 
within the monopolist's product line, and they offer insights into the scenarios in which such 
cannibalization is absent or occurs. In particular, Mussa and Rosen [21] show that offering 
multiple qualities is optimal for the monopolist under a linear consumer utility function and 
continuous types; Moorthy [19] derives contrasting results by generalizing the consumer utility 
function. Furthermore, Bhargava and Choudhary [2] extend and contribute to this line of 
literature by generalizing the consumer distribution and marginal cost functions. They find that 
only the ratio of the cost of improving quality to the increase in consumers' utility is relevant in 
the monopolist's optimal strategy, and that offering the highest quality product alone is optimal if 
it has the lowest cost-to-quality ratio [2]. 
Several seminal works study vertical differentiation with competition. Shaked and Sutton 
[27] endogenize competing firms' entry decisions as well as quality and price decisions. They 
find that in equilibrium exactly two firms enter the market and produce vertically differentiated 
goods [27]. Moorthy [20] contrasts the results of vertical differentiation in a duopoly setting with 
those in a monopoly setting and points out that the competition results in inefficient 
differentiation. 
Motivated by the growth in online advertising and in online services, our work focuses on 
vertical differentiation in the context of ad-supported business models, in which firms offering 
lower quality products generate additional revenues through ad sponsorship. We follow the 
common assumption of zero marginal production costs for information goods and model 
consumer heterogeneity in consumers' sensitivity toward advertisements. Furthermore, our 
duopoly analysis differentiates from that in the literature by allowing each competing firm to 
offer multiple qualities of services simultaneously. 
Bhargava and Choudhary [2] and other related studies have suggested that researchers 
investigate the role of advertising revenue in firms' decision to offer multiple product qualities. A 
body of research in ad-supported business models has developed recently. Riggins [24] examines 
a monopolist's strategies in pricing and quality design when offering two types of products: 
Fee-based and sponsorship-based. He studies the effects of ad revenues on the product quality as 
determined by the content quality and ad relevancy [24]. His results show that decreasing ad 
revenues may lead to higher quality differentiation between two products, which raises the price 
of the fee-based product [24]. However, he does not consider the monopolist's inclusion or 
exclusion of ad sponsorship in its product offerings. Dewan et al. [7] study an ad-supported 
website manager's problem in dynamically balancing the content and advertisements on a 
website. They find that it is optimal to bring more content and fewer ads initially to generate a 
large viewer base [7]. Fan et al. [10] model how channel difference factors (e.g., the online 
channel access cost, advertising level and revenues, and program quality) affect a monopolist's 
optimal price and advertising levels in media distribution over traditional and online channels 
[10]. Kumar and Sethi [16] study the dynamic pricing problem in a hybrid service model that is 
based on both subscription revenues and advertising revenues with a CPM model, and they 
identify the optimal subscription fee and advertising level over time. Prasad et al. [23] examine a 
monopolistic media provider's problem of setting the subscription fee and advertising level when 
two types of consumers differ in their income. They find the conditions under which a 
monopoly's optimal strategy is to offer two different options that will each be adopted by a type 
of consumers (in a separating equilibrium) [23]. Our work connects ad-supported business 
strategies with the theories of vertical differentiation by accounting for different service 
combinations, analyzing pricing decisions, and comparing the CPC and CPM ad revenue models. 
We also model both monopoly and duopoly settings to understand the effect of market forces on 
firms' strategies. 
Peitz and Valletti [22] analyze the symmetric competition among pay-tv media platforms 
and among free-to-air platforms. By endogenizing the advertising level and content variety, they 
compare the competitive outcomes of the pay-tv and free-to-air cases [22]. Casadesus-Masanell 
and Zhu [5] address an incumbent's business model reconfiguration problem in choosing the 
optimal business strategy when facing an ad-sponsored entrant. They find that, among four 
choices of business models, the incumbent tends to strategize by using a pure business model 
that is based on either the subscription revenue or ad revenue, rather than using a hybrid business 
model that combines a subscription-based approach with advertising. Their explanation is that 
pure business models create greater differentiation from the entrant's service than do hybrid 
business models, thereby generating higher revenues for the incumbent [5]. In this paper, we 
endogenize the business model decisions of both competing firms and find the equilibrium. 
Moreover, we focus on the comparison of different ad revenue models rather than on 
optimization of advertising level. 
Another stream of literature to which our work is relevant is online advertising. In 
particular, studies on targeted advertising [8] [14] [11] investigate the marketing strategies that 
advertisers use to selectively influence consumer demand and the market impact of these 
strategies. Similarly, our study examines the market impact of different advertising strategies in 
both monopoly and competitive settings; however, we take the perspective of ad publishers, who 
design their service offerings to segment the market by second-degree pricing discrimination. In 
keyword advertising, many studies examine the performance-based auction mechanism for 
ranking ads and compare the efficiency of this auction mechanism to that of the traditional 
second-price auction [6] [18] [29]. We look at the interaction between intermediaries/publishers 
and consumers and study service pricing under different ad revenue models. 
An ad-supported service provider acts like a two-sided platform that joins advertisers and 
users [9]. Studies in two-sided markets literature, such as Rochet and Tirole  [25], Caillaud and 
Jullien  [4], and Armstrong  [1], investigate issues of pricing and governance structures. 
Recent works, including Boudreau [3] and Lin et al. [17], explore the the role of innovation in 
two-sided markets. In this paper, the emphasis is on endogenous business model decisions; thus, 
our model focuses only on consumer-side pricing. Our contribution to the literature on two-sided 
markets lies in identifying cases in which exclusion of the advertising side yields higher revenues, 
given market competition, the ad revenue model, and consumers' ad aversion. 
3  Ad-Supported Monopoly 
 
An online service provider may have a monopoly position because of a unique channel presence 
or an exclusive content license. We consider a monopolistic online service provider whose 
strategy choices include a single ad-free service, a single ad-supported service, and the mixed 
business model that includes both services. Moreover, the monopolist also compares the CPC 
and CPM ad revenue models in its service offering(s). The monopolist first chooses the business 
model and then sets the optimal price for each type of service offered. Note that the prices of 
ad-supported services are also endogenous – we do not assume they are zero. 
The monopolist's revenue source includes (1) the subscription revenues collected from 
consumers and, (2) if any ad-supported service is offered, the advertising revenues collected 
from advertisers according to the demand of the ad-supported service. We assume zero marginal 
cost, consistent with the literature on information goods, and homogeneous sunk costs for all 
types of services. Regardless of whether advertising support is adopted, the service provider 
incurs upfront costs in content acquisition and the technology infrastructure that supports the 
online service. For example, online content providers must acquire licenses and legal rights from 
record labels and content owners. Although advertising support may introduce additional costs, 
we are interested in the case in which the production cost of the service is dominant.1 
Suppose consumers have homogeneous valuation for the online service at the reservation 
value 0>r . In ad-supported services, ads may cause nuisance, depending on each consumer’s 
sensivity to ads. Denote consumer ad sensitivity by θ  that is uniformly distributed in the 
interval [0,1]. A consumer's utility for purchasing an ad-supported service i  at the price ip  is 
ipkr −−θ , which is a variant of the utility function in [5] and isolates the heterogeneity in 
consumers' perception of ad nuisance from the value of the service. Furthermore, },{ CMi∈ , 
where M  and C  refer to CPM- and CPC-based ad revenue models, respectively, and k  is 
the disutility of the most ad-averse consumer ( 1=θ ). Note that consumers do not distinguish 
between CPM- and CPC-based ads because both revenue models display ads in the common 
                                                     
1In general, higher advertising costs will introduce an additional condition and simply shift the firm's choice toward 
the ad-free service. However, in a separate study, exploring a richer cost structure of the advertising support might 
prove interesting. 
forms (e.g., text, image, and video).2 
Assumption 1 (Reservation Value and Disutility). Consumers’ reservation value ( r ) for the 
online service is greater than the disutility of the most ad-averse consumer ( k ).  
 Assumption 1 implies that the service itself offers substantial value, such that all 
consumers are willing to adopt it with ads if it is free. One might note that for some services, 
such as the yellow pages, many consumers would choose not to have them even when they are 
free. We impose Assumption 1 to focus on sufficiently valuable services, for which strategic 
analysis is meaningful. 
CPC and CPM models generate revenues differently. The CPM model charges 
advertisers purely on the basis of the number of ad impressions. Thus, the ad revenue is 
proportional to the number of consumers adopting the service: If the service is priced at mp  
and generates demand mq , then the monopolist's revenue is )(= mmmm pq βπ + , where mβ  is 
the ad revenue rate.3 The CPC model generates ad revenues only when consumers click on ads.  
Assumption 2 (Ad Aversion and Clicking Probability).  Consumers who are less ad-averse 
(with a lowerθ ) are more likely to click on ads.  
 Assumption 2 suggests that the CPC model relies on the consumers who are less 
sensitive to ads to generate ad revenues. Their actions (e.g., clicks) signal interest, and 
advertisers' payments are contingent on such actions. However, because even the least ad-averse 
consumer would not always click on ads, consumers' probability of clicking on ads should be 
only a fraction of θ−1 . We denote this probability by τθ )(1− , where (0,1)∈τ  is the click 
                                                     
2In the Appendix “Alternative Model Setup,” we examine an extension of the model, where the CPC ad revenue 
model leads to a higher quality service than the CPM model from consumers' perspective. The key results from the 
main model continue to hold in that setting. 
3To focus on the service provider's problem of optimal service offering(s), we use exogenous ad revenue rates and 
do not explicitly model the interaction between advertisers and the service provider. Modeling the firm as a 
two-sided platform for advertisers and consumers may reveal other insights into the firm's pricing strategies; 
however, it is likely to compromise model tractability. 
rate parameter that adjusts a consumer's ad aversion to his/her clicking probability. By offering a 
CPC-based ad-supported service priced at cp  and capturing consumers between 0θ  to 1θ , the 
monopolist's total revenue is given by θθτβθθπ
θ
θ
dp ccc )(1)(=
1
0
01 −+− ∫ , where cβ  is the ad 
revenue rate of the CPC model. 
<Insert Table 1 approximately here>  
3.1  Single-Service Business Models 
In this section, we analyze the monopolist's optimal pricing strategy for any single-service 
business model.  
Since consumers have a homogeneous reservation price for the ad-free service at r , the 
optimal price of a single ad-free service is simply r . This allows the monopolist to capture all 
consumers and derive revenues r . If the monopolist offers a single ad-supported service, it may 
strategically exclude some consumers, depending on the value of r . If the service itself provides 
adequate value (sufficiently high r ), the monopolist's optimal strategy is to serve even the most 
ad-averse consumer at the price kr − , covering the entire market; otherwise, the optimal 
strategy for the monopolist is to charge a higher price and exclude the consumers who are more 
ad-averse. The implication is that the value of service is an important factor for assessing 
price-demand trade-offs. For example, many magazines with little information content but heavy 
advertising content target only the reader base that tolerates ads. We relegate the model analysis 
to the Appendix and summarize the results of the monopolist's optimal strategies in Table 2. 
<Insert Table 2 approximately here>  
3.2  Mixed Business Models 
A mixed business model allows the monopolist to segment the market by simultaneously 
offering the ad-free and ad-supported services at different prices. The monopolist maximizes its 
collective revenues from both services:  
 ),()(1=),(max ininininni pppk
pppp ππ +−−                          (1) 
 s.t. 00, ≥−≥− inn pppr ,                                        (2) 
where },{ cmi∈ . We use lower-case letters for the subscripts of mixed business models. 
Mixed business models ensure that all consumers are served because the consumers who 
are too ad-averse to adopt the ad-supported service can opt for the ad-free service. In the CPM 
case, the monopolist pursues the mixed business model only when the ad revenue rate is below a 
certain threshold ( km 2≤β ). A higher revenue rate excludes the ad-free service -- the monopolist 
is better off with only a CPM service and covers the entire market (see Table 2). In the CPC case, 
the most ad-averse consumers will always purchase the ad-free service; the monopolist has no 
incentive to include these consumers in the ad-supported service because the revenue of the CPC 
model is contingent on consumers' interest toward ads. The details of this analysis are provided 
in the Appendix, and the results are summarized in Table 3. 
<Insert Table 3 approximately here> 
Proposition 1 (Price Discrimination with a Mixed Business Model). The optimal price of an 
ad-supported service is (weakly) higher under the mixed business model than it is under the 
single-service business model.  
Regardless of the ad revenue model, a mixed business model provides the leverage for 
price discrimination, allowing the monopolist to raise the price of the ad-supported service. 
When offering a single ad-supported service, the monopolist needs to set a sufficiently low price 
to serve some of the ad-averse consumers who would purchase nothing otherwise. Under a 
mixed business model, the ad-supported service can be priced higher to target only the 
consumers who are less ad-averse; the other consumers will purchase the ad-free service at the 
reservation price. This result suggests that offering only the ad-supported service may lead to 
underpricing the ad-supported service. For instance, Hulu, by offering only ad-supported services 
(paid and free), has been unsuccessful in capturing a sufficient user base for the paid 
ad-supported service, Hulu Plus. This problem may be mitigated by adding an ad-free service. 
Proposition 2 (Effect of Ad Revenue on Optimal Price). In both single-service and mixed 
business models, when the ad revenue rate increases, it is optimal for the monoplist to reduce the 
price of the ad-supported service. Moreover, this price reduction is more severe for the CPM 
model than for the CPC model.  
In both single-service4 and mixed business models, the ad revenue rate plays a role in the 
monopolist's trade-offs between price and demand. A higher ad revenue rate shifts the weight 
from the monopolist's subscription revenues to its ad revenues. Reducing the ad-supported 
service price captures more consumers and generates higher ad revenues. In the mixed business 
model, this shift is achieved by transferring demand from the ad-free service to the ad-supported 
service. Therefore, the ad revenue rate has an overall negative effect on the optimal price of the 
ad-supported service. 
Furthermore, we find that, as the ad revenue rate increases, the optimal price under the 
CPC model is more stable than that under the CPM model, in both single-service and mixed 
cases. Notice that the marginal consumers the monopolist captures by reducing the price are 
increasingly ad-averse. Under the CPC model, the marginal ad revenue is decreasing, because of 
the lower probability that these consumers will click on ads. The CPM-based ad revenues are 
independent of consumers' ad aversion – the monopolist has a constant marginal ad return as its 
                                                     
4For the single-service business models, the optimal price of the ad-support service is independent of the ad revenue 
rate when the market is covered. Thus, the discussion here pertains to the case when the market is not covered. 
market segment expands. Therefore, in the CPM case, the monopolist has a stronger 
price-cutting incentive, whereas in the CPC case, the incentive continually diminishes with the 
ad revenue rate. This result shows that the ad revenue model has a clear impact on the 
monopolist's pricing strategies. Given recent steady growth of online advertising, the monopolist 
service provider is likely to benefit from the pricing stability provided by the CPC ad revenue 
model. 
3.3  Business Model Comparison 
To find the monopolist's optimal business model, we first compare the single-service and mixed 
models and then find the conditions under which the dominant business model emerges. 
Proposition 3 (Optimal Monopoly Business Model). The monopolist's optimal strategy is to mix 
the ad-free service with an ad-supported service (nc or nm).  
Given either CPC or CPM revenue models, vertical differentiation achieved by offering 
services with and without ads generates higher payoffs than any single-service business model. 
Price discrimination and market segmentation allow the monopolist to set higher optimal prices, 
eliminating inefficiencies of single-service models due to low subscription revenues in the 
ad-supported case and zero ad revenue in the ad-free case. Thus, regardless of other factors, the 
monopolist online service provider is better off diversifying its service offerings in the 
ad-supported option. By including ads in both the free and paid services, the service provider, 
such as Hulu, may be playing a suboptimal strategy that not only alienates the ad-averse 
consumers but also underprices its contents. 
Proposition 4 (Optimal Ad Revenue Model). If 
c
cm k
k
τβ
τββ
+2
2< , then the optimal business 
model is to mix the ad-free service with the CPC-based ad-supported service; otherwise, 
adopting the mixed business model with the CPM-based ad-supported service is optimal.  
Proposition 4 establishes the condition under which the monopolist should mix the 
ad-free service with the CPC ad-supported service rather than with the CPM service. Figure 1 
shows the optimal regions, based on the relationship between the CPM ad revenue rate and the 
CPC ad revenue rate adjusted by the click rate parameter. If the adjusted CPC revenue rate is 
sufficiently greater than the CPM revenue rate, the mixed business model with the CPC model is 
optimal. 
<Insert Figure 1 approximately here>  
Although it is intuitive that the optimal ad revenue model depends on the relative ad 
revenue rates, we reveal a nonlinear relationship between the revenue rates of the two models 
that determines the optimal strategy. The concave curve in Figure 1 implies that the CPC model 
generates revenues at an increasingly higher efficiency than the CPM model, as the revenue rate 
increases. The driving force is the change in the monopolist's optimal trade-offs between the 
subscription revenues and ad revenues. A higher CPM ad revenue rate induces the monopolist to 
lower the price of the CPM service to achieve higher ad returns; the instability in price amplifies 
as the CPM revenue rate further increases. This tendency to become advertising-driven is much 
less pronounced in the CPC case because the monopolist, in reducing price, can attract only  
increasingly ad-averse consumers, who would then generate decreasing marginal ad revenues. 
Therefore, the stability of the optimal price offered by the CPC model pays off as the revenue 
rate increases. 
4  Ad-Supported Duopoly Competition 
In this section, we analyze two competing firms' equilibrium business models. Following the 
setup in the monopoly setting, each firm may offer a single service that is either ad-free or 
ad-supported (i.e., N, C, or M), or offer a mix of ad-free and ad-supported services (i.e., nc or 
nm). The two firms first choose their business models simultaneously and then set equilibrium 
prices. 
The cases in which both firms offer the ad-free service are trivial. Either the 
single-service (N) or the mixed business model (nc or nm) leads to the Bertrand-type competition 
that results in equilibrium prices of zero,5 assuming non-negative pricing. The two firms then 
split the market, and both derive zero revenue in equilibrium. The remaining non-trivial cases are 
shown in Figure 2. 
<Insert Figure 2 approximately here> 
When firms offer only ad-supported services, consumers are indifferent between 
purchasing from either firm. Given Assumption 1, all consumers are willing to adopt an 
ad-supported service for free. Thus, two firms split the market and set the equilibrium price at 
zero as a result of Bertrand competition. Note that each firm's choice of ad revenue model is 
independent of the rival's decision, because neither demand nor price is affected by that decision. 
The CPC ad-supported service yields the revenue cC τβπ 4
1=* , and for the CPM service 
mM βπ 2
1=* . In equilibrium, both firms will choose the model that is more profitable on the basis 
of the relative ad revenue rates. The competition between the basic version of Yahoo! Mail and 
that of Hotmail is an example of this simple case. 
4.1 Single-Service Business Models (B1) 
Without loss of generality, suppose that only firm 1 offers the ad-free service. When both firms 
have a single-service business model, they simply differentiate in quality, with firm 1 providing 
the premium ad-free service and firm 2 offering a cheaper ad-supported alternative. When firm 
                                                     
5When the ad-free service is priced at zero, the ad-supported service also cannot be priced above zero because it is 
perceived as the lower quality service as compared with the ad-free service. 
2's ad revenue rate is lower, both firms set a positive price; otherwise, firm 2's ad-supported 
service is offered for free.  
<Insert Table 4 approximately here> 
Proposition 5 (Effect of Ad Revenue on Equilibrium Prices). As firm 2 earns a higher ad 
revenue rate, both firms cut price in equilibrium; moreover, when firm 2 adopts the CPM model, 
the price reductions are more severe than the case with the CPC model.  
The revenue rate of firm 2's advertising support may intensify price competition. 
Regardless of firm 2's ad revenue model, both firms' equilibrium prices fall as the ad revenue rate 
increases. Consistent with the monopoly case, a higher ad revenue rate incentivizes firm 2 to 
extract more ad revenues by cutting its price and stimulating demand; however, in a duopoly, 
competition further induces price cuts by the rival, firm 1. As a result, changes in the ad revenue 
rate for one firm can lead to an industry-wide service price fluctuation, triggered by competition. 
This, combined with fast-growing online advertising revenues, may help to explain the losses 
suffered by the traditional print business and the difficulty in monetizing purely 
subscription-based online services. 
Furthermore, in a duopoly, the CPC model offers more price stability than the CPM 
model, as shown in the monopoly setting. The price competition that arises with an increase in 
the ad revenue rate intensifies to a higher degree when firm 2 has the CPM model than when it 
has the CPC model. This shows that the strength of ad revenue effect persists, as competition 
carries it over to the rival's price. 
4.2 Mixing Ad-Free and Ad-Supported Services (B2) 
In this case, firm 1 has a mixed business model, while firm 2 offers a single ad-supported service. 
Bertrand competition occurs between two firms' ad-supported services, resulting in an 
equilibrium price of zero for both firms' ad-supported service.  
Table 5 summarizes the equilibrium in this case: The ad-supported services are free, and 
firm 1 sets the ad-free service price according to what provides an optimal balance between its 
own subscription and ad revenues. A striking difference of the duopoly equilibrium as compared 
with the optimal results in the monopoly is that the ad-free service is not priced at the reservation 
value r . In most cases, firm 1 sets a price lower than r  to compete with its own and the rival's 
ad-supported services. Only when firm 1 adopts a CPM ad revenue model that has an extremely 
high ad revenue rate, does firm 1 raise the equilibrium price of the ad-free service to effectively 
offer only the ad-supported service. 
<Insert Table 5 approximately here> 
In practice, we rarely observe any online service that is provided in only the ad-supported 
form. Web mail services (e.g., Yahoo!) have the subscription-based, ad-free version; online 
games (e.g., Pogo.com) sometimes offer the paid ad-free option; and Internet radio can be 
streamed without commercial interruptions (e.g., Pandora's subscription service).6 
Proposition 6 (Effect of Ad Revenue on Equilibrium Ad-Free Price). When firm 1 mixes 
ad-free and ad-supported services, it raises the price of the ad-free service as it earns a higher 
ad revenue rate from the ad-supported service. Moreover, this price increase is more 
pronounced when firm 1 adopts the CPM model than the CPC model.  
The effect of the ad revenue rate on price in the present case reverses those in the other 
cases, which consistently indicate that an increase in the ad revenue rate leads to lower 
optimal/equilibrium price(s) (Figure 3). A reason for this difference is that, in the present case, 
firm 1 offers two services that are competing, and it leverages the price of the ad-free service to 
                                                     
6The search engine service appears to be an exception, but, in this special case, search users are likely to find ads 
useful. 
shift demand to/from the ad-support service. Thus, as the ad revenue rate of its ad-supported 
service increases, firm 1 is inclined to transfer some of the ad-free demand to the ad-supported 
service by inflating the ad-free service price. Also in the present case, the ad-supported service is 
free; the competition triggered is then more intense than that within a monopolist's mixed 
business model. These contrasts emphasize the importance of market structure for assessing the 
impact of ad revenues on firms' strategies. 
<Insert Figure 3 approximately here>  
Figure 3 also compares CPC and CPM models in different settings. Consistent across all 
scenarios is that the CPC ad revenue model offers greater price stability. When the ad revenue 
rate becomes higher, firm 1 raises the price of the ad-free service more aggressively if it offers 
the CPM service than if it offers the CPC service. The reason, again, is that the CPM model leads 
to higher marginal ad revenue gains. 
4.3  Equilibrium Business Models 
We now solve the equilibrium business model by comparing all of the scenarios in the duopoly. 
The cases in which an ad-free service is present in both firms' business models cannot occur in 
equilibrium, because either firm would prefer switching to the ad-supported service to achieve a 
positive revenue. We have also eliminated Case A, in which both firms offer a single 
ad-supported service. Within the many scenarios of Cases B1 and B2 that are remaining (Figure 
4), the equilibrium business models depend on the parameter values and the relationships 
between mβ , τ , cβ , and k . We examine two specific conditions, cm τββ > and mc βτβ 2> , 
under which key equilibrium results emerge. We refer to the Appendix for further discussions on 
the equilibrium results and these conditions. 
<Insert Figure 4 approximately here> 
In equilibrium, the ad-free service is offered by exactly one firm, either as the only option 
in a single-service business model or as an alternative to the ad-supported service in a mixed 
business model; the rival's equilibrium strategy is to offer only an ad-supported service. Recall 
that a monopolist's optimal strategy is vertical differentiation, which effectively segments the 
market to yield higher subscription and advertising revenues. In a duopoly equilibrium, two 
firms vertically differentiate and segment the market in a similar manner, provided that the ad 
revenue rate is below a certain threshold, so that the ad-free firm offers a single service. An 
excessively high ad revenue rate, however, induces the ad-free firm to also offer an ad-supported 
service; in this case, the ad-free firm alone creates vertical differentiation, and the subscription 
revenue of the ad-supported services disappears as a result of Bertrand competition. 
The ad revenue rate is the factor determining the equilibrium outcome where vertical 
differentiation is created by two firms or by a single firm. Higher ad revenue rates lead to the 
case of vertical differentiation by a single firm, resulting in intense competition and destroying 
the subscription revenue of ad-supported services. In practice, many online service providers rely 
primarily on advertising revenues as a result of competition triggered by growing online 
advertising spending. Although the few online game sites (e.g., Pogo.com) offer a paid option 
with limited ads, most other competing game sites are financed by advertisers. Similarly, 
Pandora provides subscription-based, commercial-free online music service, whereas the 
competing service, Jango, is free and ad-supported. 
5  Discussion 
5.1  Theoretical Contribution 
Our main contributions to the existing literature include four aspects. First, we examine the 
theories of vertical differentiation with consideration for advertising revenue, which is a key 
element of online business models with multiple qualities of services; our findings highlight the 
importance of understanding ad revenue models in monetizing online services. Second, our study 
takes into account service providers’ decisions in both service pricing and business model design, 
as business strategies emcompass both dimensions; we identify the effect of ad revenue on 
service pricing that contrasts with past findings. Third, we analyze and compare the revenue 
models of the CPC- and CPM-based ad-supported services; our findings show sharp differences 
in their strategic implications for service pricing and business model choice with and without 
competition. Lastly, our model allows both competing firms to strategize in their business model 
configurations and proves the optimality of simultaneously offering both ad-free and 
ad-supported services. 
We introduce advertising revenues into the problem of vertical differentiation, which is 
studied mainly under conditions of cost structure and consumer utility function in the literature 
[21] [19] [2]. Even though ad revenues mitigate the cannibalistic effect of introducing a 
lower-quality, ad-supported service, ad revenues may also lower the optimal price of the 
ad-supported service in the monopoly case. Thus, a monopolistic service provider faces a 
complex problem of balancing the advertising and subscription revenues. When considering 
competition, past findings indicate that firms differentiate to avoid competition [27] [20]. 
However, considering advertising support shows that higher ad revenues may intensify 
competition by incentivizing strategies that reduce differentiation of business models and by 
inducing price cuts. In this case, exactly one firm benefits from differentiation by offering both 
ad-free and ad-supported services, whereas the rival resorts to relying solely on ad revenues. 
By endogenizing firms' pricing decisions and analyzing both monopoly and duopoly 
cases, we gain a more in-depth understanding of the strategic role of advertising support. Riggins 
[24] models a monopolistic setting that offers fee-based and sponsorship-based services and 
finds that decreasing (increasing) ad revenues raises (reduces) the price of the fee-based product. 
We find a similar result in the duopoly case: When the ad revenue rate of the ad-supported firm 
increases, the rival that offers the ad-free service reduces its price under competitive pressure. 
However, the monopoly case of our model reveals that an increase in the ad revenue rate reduces 
the price of only the ad-supported service. One key difference in our work is that the firm also 
strategize in pricing the ad-supported service, whereas in [24] the sponsorship-based product is 
assumed to be free.7 The price endogeneity in our analysis shows that it may be optimal for a 
monopolist to charge a fee for the ad-supported service according to the ad revenue rate. 
By comparing CPC and CPM ad revenue models, we tackle a new area in the theoretical 
research of online advertising. To the best of our knowledge, existing studies have not examined 
the effect of different ad revenue models on firms' business strategies. Because the efficacy of 
these ad revenue models is closely linked with users' ad aversion, our model draws from this 
connection and suggests that the CPM revenue model leads to greater instability in service 
pricing and provokes more intense competition. On the other hand, the CPC model relies more 
on consumers' willingness to receive ads and thus mitigates the trade-off between subscription 
and advertising revenues. 
Our findings mirror some of those discussed by Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu [5], who 
examine an incumbent's optimal strategy given that a market entrant offers a free, ad-supported 
service. By allowing both firms to configure their business models and by analyzing multiple 
service offerings, our study presents additional strategic insights. The consistent result in both 
our work and [5] is that when the ad revenue rate is sufficiently low, one firm offers the 
fee-based, ad-free service, while the other offers the ad-supported service. For higher values of 
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the ad revenue rate, [5] suggests that the incumbent's optimal strategy is to adopt the same 
business model as the rival, regardless of the trade-offs. In contrast, we take into account 
multiple-service offerings and find that one firm offers both the ad-supported and ad-free 
services in equilibrium. This result highlights that, even under competitive pressure, a firm can 
obtain the strategic leverage from offering multiple types of services to segment the market. 
Although both firms adopt the ad support, the ad-averse consumers nevertheless have access to 
the ad-free service from the firm offering multiple services.  
5.2  Managerial Implications 
 Our study sheds light on online service providers' business model strategies under 
market forces, on pricing of ad-supported and ad-free services, and on strategic implications of 
CPC versus CPM ad revenue models. 
By contrasting results in the monopoly and duopoly settings, we emphasize the 
consideration of firms' market position in their business model choice. Even in the fiercely 
competitive online service industry, channel diversity, licensing strategies, and the dynamic 
landscape open monopolistic opportunities for some online service providers. For example, Hulu 
is privileged to be the exclusive partner of ABC, Comedy Central, FOX, NBCUniversal, and 
other content owners for current TV episodes. Furthermore, Hulu faces no competition from 
cable television providers over the mobile media, such as the iPad and Android tablets. Despite 
the initial buzz generated by its free ad-supported online service, Hulu's paid ad-supported 
service, Hulu Plus, led to a series of disappointing market performances. It received loud 
complaints for including ads and resorted to a downward subscription fee adjustment—from 
$9.99 to $7.99 per month [28]. According to our findings, when a service provider has exclusive 
access to a market segment, its optimal profile of service offerings should always include both 
ad-free and ad-supported services, in which the ad-free service plays a critical role in price 
discrimination. Offering only ad-supported services that are vertically differentiated does not 
effectively segment the market because of consumers' ad aversion. As a result, failure to provide 
the ad-free service tends to lead to underpricing of the ad-supported service. 
Furthermore, contrary to the common assumption that an ad-supported service should 
always be free, our findings underscore that Hulu's strategic shortcoming was in its failure to 
introduce an ad-free service rather than in the pricing of its ad-supported services. In fact, a 
properly priced ad-free service might actually help leverage a paid ad-supported service, given 
Hulu's monopoly power. The cable providers are a closely related example in that they often 
have the monopoly position and have been successful in packaging both paid ad-supported (e.g., 
ESPN) and ad-free (e.g., HBO) channels. Hulu provides the content of similar quality and variety 
over a newly emerged medium; given that it secures partnerships with content owners and 
engages viewers in a quality experience, Hulu's optimal business model should include both paid 
ad-free and ad-supported services. 
Online service providers commonly face intense competition, in which case their 
business model strategies may not always include both ad-free and ad-supported options. Among 
the many Internet radio services with the capability of online music discovery, Pandora is one of 
the few to offer a paid ad-free service, whereas its key competitor, Jango, has only one option: 
the free ad-supported service. Similarly, most online game providers offer only ad-supported 
services; a few exceptions provide ad-free or limited-advertising services that are priced higher. 
Our findings suggest that these providers should indeed rely largely on ad revenues and be 
cautious about introducing an ad-free service, because direct competition could destroy the 
subscription revenue. We note that a number of Internet music providers, such as Spotify, 
Rhapsody, and Slacker, offer the on-demand paid service, which is a significantly different 
premium service than that offered by online music discovery services such as Pandora. In this 
scenario, the online services explore differentiation outside of advertising to monetize their 
subscription services. 
Analyzing different ad revenue models to reveal and compare their effect can be 
meaningful to online service providers. Currently, many online service providers receive ads and 
payment statistics from a third-party platform -- assessing different ad revenue models poses a 
challenge. For instance, mochimedia hosts a platform that brings together online game 
developers, advertisers, and publishers. Publishers, who are online game providers, receive both 
CPM and performance-based ads and generate ad revenues based on eCPM (effective cost per 
impression), computed by mochimedia [30]. Similarly, Google's AdSense program allocates 
CPM and performance-based ads on its publishers' sites and provides only aggregate statistics to 
its publishers. Our analysis presents to online service providers an evaluation of the contingency 
featured in performance-based models and contrasts it with the traditional CPM model that 
guarantees “unconditional” ad returns. 
In comparison with the CPM ad revenue model, performance-based revenue models (e.g., 
CPC) offer greater service price stability and more efficiency in generating revenues. These 
qualities of performance-based models suggest a strong potential for wide adoption. In fact, most 
online services, including those that are traditionally based on video ads or graphic-intensive ads, 
have also adopted performance-based ads (e.g., YouTube). Moreover, the Interactive Advertising 
Bureau reports that the proportion of performance-based ad revenues among total online ad 
revenues has surpassed that of impression-based ad revenues, at 62% versus 33% in 2010 [13]. 
6  Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine vertical differentiation in online service provision with advertising 
support, while comparing the CPC and CPM ad revenue models. In both monopoly and duopoly 
settings, we model service providers’ business model and pricing decisions. We show that a 
monopolist's optimal business model always includes both ad-free and ad-supported services, 
whereas in a channel with competing online services, the ad-free service is offered by exactly 
one provider. Furthermore, the level of ad revenue rate is an important factor determining 
whether this provider also offers the ad-supported service that would lead to an intense price 
competition with the rival. Moreover, while a higher ad revenue rate leads to lower service prices, 
the CPC ad revenue model offers greater price stability than the CPM revenue model in both 
monopoly and competitive cases. 
We suggest several future extensions to address the limitations of this paper. First, 
considering multiple ad-supported options that are vertically differentiated may be a promising 
direction. In the Appendix, section “Alternative Model Setup” moves in this direction by tying 
service quality to the ad revenue model in a monopoly setting, assuming that the CPC 
ad-supported service is the higher quality service, relative to the CPM service. To capture the full 
picture, however, it may be necessary to endogenize the quality of ad-supported services by 
letting advertisers set ad effectiveness and choose the ad revenue model. In this extension, the 
advertiser-side pricing will be a critical instrument for creating suitable incentives among 
advertisers. Offering both the CPM-based and CPC-based services could be an optimal strategy, 
which runs counter to Proposition 9 in the Appendix. It is possible that an endogenous 
advertiser-side price would induce the ad revenue rate and quality gap close to those specified in 
the conditions of Proposition 10, where the optimal business model includes all types of services. 
Furthermore, this two-sided model would also have the power to illustrate the relationship 
between the service price and advertising fees. 
Another future direction is in the dynamics of product introduction. In this paper, we use 
static settings to capture the market equilibrium; however, to understand strategies to adapt to the 
increasing demand for online services, it may be useful to consider a sequential decision problem. 
A dynamic pricing model would capture the transition from a traditional, subscription-based 
business model to an ad-supported model with demand uncertainty. Furthermore, firms may also 
need to decide whether to offer the new service as a separate option or as an add-on to the 
existing service. 
Lastly, it may be interesting to explore different cost structures of adopting an advertising 
support, since we consider only the case in which the cost of the service is dominant. This would 
help separate service providers who manage their own advertiser relations from those who 
receive ads from an intermeidary service, such as Google AdSense. 
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Appendix 
  
Monopoly: Single-Service Business Models 
 
Ad-free, N 
Without advertisements, consumers have the same surplus, NN prpu −=)( . It is intuitive that 
the monopolist then fully extracts consumers' surplus and sets the optimal price of the ad-free 
service at rpN =
* , and its revenue is rN =
*π . 
 
CPC-Based Ad Support 
Consumers prefer purchasing the ad-supported service over nothing when 0>Cpkr −−θ , 
which implies that the indifference consumer is 
k
pr C−=*θ . The monopolist's profit 
maximization problem is the following:  
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The first-order condition (FOC) with respect to Cp is:  
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1=* +− .  
By Assumption 1, 0>*Cp  in both cases; therefore, the monopolist always sets a positive 
optimal price when offering a single CPC-based ad-supported service. 
 
CPM-Based Ad Support 
The analysis here is similar to the CPC case. The indifference consumer is 
k
pr M−=*θ , and the 
monopolist's Lagrangian equation is:  
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where we also must have 0=1λ . When 0=2λ , market is not covered, we derive the optimal 
results: 
2
=* mM
rp β− , 
k
r m
M 4
)(=
2
* βπ
+ , and the demand is 
k
r m
2
β+ . 1<
2k
r mβ+  implies 
mkr β−2< . When 0>2λ , the market is covered, and the monopolist then sets the optimal price 
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*  and earns the revenue mM kr βπ +−=
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Therefore, when offering a single CPM-based ad-supported service, if mkr β−2< , the 
market is not covered, 
2
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Monopoly: Mixed Business Models 
 
Ad-Free and CPC-Based Ad-Supported Services 
When the monopolist offers both ad-free and CPC-based ad-supported services, the 
maximization problem is the following:  
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From Eq. (6) and Eq. (7), the Lagrangian equation can be written as:  
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The FOCs with respect to np  and cp  are:  
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Adding the two FOCs shows that 0>1=*1λ , so the constraint is active, and rpn =
* . By solving 
the FOCs, we then get that 
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the ad-free and the CPC-based ad-supported services, the monopolist serves the entire market, 
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Ad-Free and CPM-Based Ad-Supported Services 
Here, the monopolist’s revenue function takes the following form:  
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Similar to the analysis in the CPC case, we derive that the monopolist also covers the entire 
market here and that the optimal solution is 
2
=,= ** mmn rprp
β
− , and 
k
r mnm 4
=
2
* βπ + . The 
indifference consumer here is 
k
m
2
=* βθ , which is between 0 and 1 when km 2≤β . When 
km 2>β , the monopolist offers only the CPM ad-supported service at the optimal price 
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(see Table 2). 
 
Duopoly: Single-Service Business Models (B1) 
By offering the ad-free service only, firm 1's revenue function is:  
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Firm 2's revenue function depends on the revenue model of the ad-supported service. For the 
CPC model:  
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Consumers choose firm 1’s ad-free service if 21 > pkrpr −−− θ , or k
pp 21> −θ . The FOC of 
firm 1’s revenue function (Eq. (10)) is 0=21 21
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When firm 2 adopts the CPM ad revenue model, firm 1's FOC remains unchanged, while 
the FOC firm 2's revenue function (Eq. (12)) becomes 0=2 21
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yields the equilibrium prices 
3
2=*1 m
kp β−  and 
3
2=*2 m
kp β− , and then the equilibrium 
revenues can be derived: 
k
k m
9
)(2=
2
*
1
β
π
−  and 
k
k m
9
)(=
2
*
2
β
π
+ . Positive *2p  implies that 
/2< kmβ . Thus, when /2km ≥β , then 0=
*
2p , /2=
*
1 kp , /2=
*
2 mβπ , and /4=
*
1 kπ . 
 
Duopoly: Firm 1 Adopts a Mixed Business Model (B2) 
Since both firms' ad-supported services have a price of zero, consumers are indifferent between 
the ad-free and ad-supported services when krpr n θ−− = ; thus, the demand for the ad-free 
service is 
k
pn−1 . Regardless of firm 2's model choice, if firm 1 adopts the CPC model, its 
revenue function has the form, θτβθπ dp
k
pp ck
np
n
n
nnc )(12
1)(1=)(
0
−+− ∫ ; with the CPM model, 
it has the revenue function, mnnnnnm k
pp
k
pp βπ
2
1)(1=)( +− . Firm 2's revenue is also a function 
of firm 1's pricing strategy: θτβθπ dp ck
np
nC )(12
1=)(
0
−∫  and mnnM k
pp βπ
2
1=)(  for CPC- and 
CPM-based ad revenue models, respectively. 
If firm 1 has the business model nc , the FOC is 0=1
2
21 2 
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kk
p ncn τβ , which 
yields 
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kkp
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4
)(2=* . Notice that the indifference consumer (between purchasing the ad-free 
and ad-supported services) is 1<
4
2=*
c
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τβ
τβ
θ
+
+ , implying that the ad-free demand is positive; 
also, rpn <
* , since rk < . From *np , we derive firm 1's revenue )4(4
)(2=
2
*
c
c
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k
τβ
τβ
π
+
+  and firm 2's 
revenue for the CPC and CPM models: 2
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Similarly, if firm 1 chooses the nm  business model, the FOC is 0=
2
21
kk
p mn β+− , 
which yields 
4
2=* mn
kp β+ , which gives firm 1’s revenue 
k
k m
nm 16
)(2=
2
* βπ
+  and, for firm 2, 
))(6(2
64
= 2
*
mm
c
C kkk
ββτβπ −+  and )(2
8
=* mmM kk
ββπ + . This equilibrium requires the condition 
km 2≤β , which implies 1* ≤θ . 
When km 2>β , no consumer purchases the ad-free service; thus, firm 1 would set 
*
np  
such that krpr n θ−− >
*  for all θ . Therefore, when km 2>β , the entire market is split 
between the two firms' ad-supported services: For firm 1, kpn >
*  and 
2
=* mnm
βπ , and, for firm 
2, 
4
=* cC
τβ
π  and 
2
=* mM
βπ . 
Notice that Case B2 is a general case that endogenizes firms' decisions in Case A, where 
both firms only offer ad-supported services. In Case B2, firm 1 can adjust the price of the ad-free 
service to include or eliminate the demand for the ad-free service. Therefore, we can rule out 
Case A in the analysis of the equilibrium business model, which reduces our analysis to the 
matrix shown in Figure 4. It can be verified that, given the rival's strategy, firm 1's optimal 
revenue under the mixed business model (Table 5) is indeed higher than its revenue without the 
ad-free service: 0>** Cnc ππ −  and 0
** ≥− Mnm ππ . 
 
Duopoly: Discussion of Equilibrium Business Models 
Proposition 7 (CPM Equilibrium). When cm τββ > , in equilibrium firm 2 chooses the 
CPM-based ad-supported service, and firm 1 never chooses the mixed business model with a 
CPC ad revenue model ( nc is a dominated strategy). In particular, if *> mm ββ , in equilibrium 
firm 1 adopts the mixed business model with the CPM model, otherwise, firm 1 offers a single 
ad-free service.  
Proposition 8 (CPC Equilibrium). When mc βτβ 2> , in equilibrium firm 2 chooses the 
CPC-based ad-supported service (C is a dominant strategy), and firm 1 never chooses the mixed 
business model with a CPM ad revenue model ( nm  is a dominated strategy). In particular, if 
*> cc βτβ , in equilibrium firm 1 adopts the mixed business model with the CPC model, otherwise, 
firm 1 offers a single ad-free service.  
The conditions in Propositions 7 and 8 highlight the cases of a unique equilibrium but 
also do not preclude any strategy sets that would otherwise emerge in equilibrium. The 
remaining two strategy sets, ( nc , M ) and ( nm , C ), cannot occur in equilibrium, because two 
firms will always choose the same, more profitable ad revenue model. Without the conditions in 
Propositions 7 and 8, multiple equilibria may be established; the equilibria will consist of a 
combination of the equilibrium strategy sets indicated in these propositions. 
 
Alternative Model Setup: Vertically Differentiated Ad-Supported Services 
Here we consider an extension of the main model, where two ad revenue models result in 
different qualities of service experience for consumers. For model tractability, we focus on the 
case in which CPC ads create a higher quality service than CPM ads (or, equivalently, CPM ads 
induce higher disutility than CPC ads). This assumption is driven by the emphasis on contextual 
relevance and targeting precision in the CPC model to convert views to immediate user actions 
and recognizes that the CPM model traditionally focuses on increasing brand awareness and 
influencing consumers' future purchase behavior.8 Denote by Lk  and Hk  the disutility induced 
by CPM and CPC ads, respectively; thus, HL kk > . To simplify notations, we normalize Lk  to 
k  and let kkk LH αα ==  where (0,1)∈α . Following Assumption 1, ikr >  for },{ HLi∈ . 
For single-service business models, only the optimal strategies for the ad-supported 
                                                     
8It is also possible that a service with CPM ads has a higher quality than a service with CPC ads. For example, Super 
Bowl commercials are some of the most popular ads, adding to the excitement of the NFL game. Thus, ultimately, 
advertisers choose ad effectiveness and the service quality. We further discuss this point as a future direction in the 
conclusion. 
services may change from those in the main model (Table 6). 
 
<Insert Table 6 approximately here>   
For mixed business models, when the monopolist offers both the ad-free and CPC ad-supported 
services, rpn =
*  and 
c
c
h k
krp
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τβα
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−
2
=* , and 
)2(2
=
22
*
c
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r
τβα
βτ
π
+
+ . Its optimal strategies 
when offering ad-free and CPM ad-supported services are identical to those in the main model. 
We can easily verify that Proposition 2 from the main model holds here: In both 
single-service and mixed business models, the optimal price of the ad-supported service 
decreases with the ad revenue rate; also, the CPC ad revenue model leads to greater price 
stability than the CPM model. 
 
Multiple Ad-Supported Services 
In this section, we consider the monopolist's strategies when combining two qualities of 
ad-supported services.  
 
hl Business Model 
The monopolist offers both high- and low-quality ad-supported services but does not include the 
ad-free service. Its maximization problem is:   
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By summing the FOCs of Eq. (13), we get 0=)1(2 22k
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c
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τβ
α
−
+−+
− . 
In the interior solution, 0>
)(1
>
k
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k
pr lhh
αα −
−− , the monopolist has positive demand for 
both ad-supported services. We get the following results: 
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To ensure that the above interior solution exists, we need the following condition:  
 0.>
)2(1 c
cm
k τβα
τββ
−−
−                                         (14) 
 
There are also two corner solutions that are equivalent to the H case and the L case of 
single-service business models: When lh pp =  (i.e., 0=)(1 k
pp lh
α−
− ), all consumers will buy the 
high-quality service, which is equivalent to not offering the low-quality ad-supported service at 
all; and when hp  is sufficiently high (i.e., k
pp
k
pr lhh
)(1
=
αα −
−− ), all consumers resort to the 
low-quality service. 
 
“all” Business Model 
When offering all three types of service, the monopolist's maximization problem is:   
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The Lagrangian function can be written as  
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Adding the FOCs shows that 0>1λ , so rpn =* . 
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This interior solution also requires condition (14). The two corner solutions correspond exactly 
to the two cases of mixing each ad-supported service with the ad-free service. The first is 
c
c
h k
krp
τβα
τβα
+
−
2
=* , ** = hl pp , and )2(2
=
22
*
c
c
all k
r
τβα
βτ
π
+
+ , which is equivalent to the case of 
offering only the CPC-based service with the ad-free service because no consumer would adopt 
the lower-quality CPM service; the other one is ** )(1= lh prp αα +− , 2
=* ml rp
β
− , and 
k
r mall 4
=
2
* βπ + , equivalent to the case where only the ad-free and CPM-based services are offered.  
Proposition 9  If mc βτβ > , or cm τββ ≥  and 0<)2(1 ck τβα −− , simultaneously offering the 
CPC and CPM ad-supported services (either the hl  or all  business model) is suboptimal.  
Proposition 9 suggests that offering both CPM and CPC ad-supported services may lead 
to cannibalization. The CPM service, the low-quality service, cannibalizes the CPC service by 
tapping into the consumer segment that has a lower ad aversion, which the CPC model primarily 
relies on for generating ad revenues. This result contrasts with the finding in Casadesus-Masanell 
and Zhu [5], where offering two vertically differentiated, ad-supported services (termed a “dual 
model”) does not lead to cannibalization. The main difference in our model is that we isolate 
consumer heterogeneity in ad aversion from the valuation for the service, whereas in [5], 
consumers value service quality and advertising level based on the same taste parameter. We 
also account for the inclusion of ad-free service and find that such cannibalization still occurs 
with the ad-free service. 
There exists a scenario in which the optimal strategy allows for the coexistence of CPC 
and CPM ad-supported services. It requires a sufficiently high ad revenue rate in the CPM model 
( cm τββ ≥ ) and considerable quality differentiation between the two ad-supported services 
( 0)2(1 ≥−− ck τβα ). The ad revenues from the CPM model combined with mitigated 
competition (due to the quality gap) compensate for the loss in the CPC-generated ad revenues; 
thus, vertically differentiated ad-supported services may be sustainable. 
Proposition 10  If mc βτβ > , or cm τββ ≥  and 0<)2(1 ck τβα −− , the monopolist's optimal 
strategy is to offer the ad-free service with the CPC ad-supported service when 
c
cm k
k
τβα
τββ
+2
2<  and with the CPM service otherwise. If cm τββ ≥  and 
0)2(1 ≥−− ck τβα , offering the ad-free service with both ad-supported services (all) is optimal.  
Proposition 10 mirrors Proposition 4 in the main model and uncovers a new finding. The 
monopolist may choose between the two mixed business models as the optimal strategy, and the 
condition follows that in the optimal strategy of the main model (Proposition 4). In addition, the 
business model that combines all three services may be optimal here, given a high CPM ad 
revenue rate and a substantial quality gap. The intuition builds on that of Proposition 9: Offering 
all three services is superior than offering ad-free and CPC services, because introducing the 
CPM ad-supported service will boost the ad revenues ( cm τββ ≥ ); the all  business model also 
dominates only offering ad-free and CPM services, because the CPC ad-supported service can 
contribute substantially to subscription revenues given the quality difference 
( 0)2(1 ≥−− ck τβα ). 
 
Proofs 
 
Proof of Proposition 1.  
Proof. In the CPC case, for kr 2< , 0<
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− . In the CPM case, for mkr β−2< , 0<2
=** rpp mM
−
− ; for mkr β−≥ 2 , 
0
2
=** ≤−− kpp mmM
β , given km 2≤β .  
 
Proof of Proposition 2.  
Proof. Single-Service Case: First, for kr 2< , 0
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*
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independent of mβ . Therefore, both prices are decreasing in the corresponding revenue rate. 
To show that the optimal price under the CPM-based model is more sensitive than that 
under the CPC-based model, we need 
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Proof of Proposition 3.  
Proof. By comparing the equilibrium revenues, it is straightforward to see that ** > Nnc ππ , 
** > Nnm ππ . We then compare 
*
ncπ  and 
*
nmπ  with 
*
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*
Mπ , respectively. 
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Proof of Proposition 4.  
Proof. Let 
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the nc  business model dominates nm , and vice versa.  
 
Proof of Proposition 5.  
Proof. By taking the derivatives with respect to cβ  for the CPC-based model and with respect 
to mβ  for the CPM-based model, we derive that for firm 2, 0<)(3
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decreasing in firm 2's ad revenue rate. 
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∂ ** < , which implies that firm 2's equilibrium 
price in the CPM model is more sensitive to the ad revenue rate than that in the CPC model. And 
from 22 )(3
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1<2 ckk τβτ + , we have 
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∂ ** < , implying that firm 1's equilibrium price is 
more sensitive given the rival has the CPM-based model than when it has the CPC-based model.  
 
Proof of Proposition 6.  
Proof. When firm 1 chooses nc , 22
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)/(42= c
c
n kkp τβτ
β
+
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∂ . When firm 1 chooses nm  and 
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np  is independent of mβ . Both 
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clearly positive, thus, the price of the ad-free service is increasing in the ad revenue rate. 
Furthermore, 
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∂ ** < , since 22 )(4
4
1<2 ckk τβτ + ; therefore, the ad-free service price 
increases at a higher rate with the CPM model.  
 
Proof of Proposition 7.  
Proof. To prove firm 2's dominant strategy is M  when cm τββ > , we need to show that given 
firm 1 choosing N , nc , and nm , firm 2 is better off choosing M  over C :   
• When firm 1 chooses N , we need to show for firm 2, ** > CM ππ  in all cases.  
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1) 
2
<< kmc βτβ . Since 
*
Mπ  is increasing in mβ , if 
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which is positive, given 
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4) kc ≥τβ . Since 0>8
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1=)( ** ccCcM τβτβπτβπ −− , then for cm τββ > , 
** > CM ππ . 
Therefore, we can conclude that given firm 1 chooses N , for firm 2, M  dominates C , 
if cm τββ > . 
 
• When firm 1 chooses nc , firm 2's equilibrium revenues for M  and C  are 
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− , then ** > CM ππ  for cm τββ > . Therefore, given firm 1 
chooses nc , for firm 2, M  dominates C , if cm τββ > . 
 
• When firm 1 chooses nm , we need to compare the revenues under two cases, km 2≤β  and 
km 2>β . When km 2≤β , k
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mCM 8
)(6** τβββππ −≥⇐≥ , which holds since 1<
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k mβ−  and 
cm τββ > . When km 2>β , 4
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cm τββ  for cm τββ > . Therefore, given firm 1 chooses nm , for 
firm 2, M  dominates C , if cm τββ > .  
 We have shown that, if cm τββ > , firm 2's dominant strategy is M . Now given firm 2 
choosing M , we compare firm 1's payoffs.   
• We first compare firm 1's strategies nc  and nm , the revenues under which are  
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Therefore, nm  dominates nc , given cm τββ > .  
• We now compare firm 1's payoffs under nm  and N . When 
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which is increasing in mβ ; it is also negative when 0=mβ  and positive when 2
= kmβ . 
Therefore, there exists 
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<<0 * kmβ , such that when 
*> mm ββ , firm 1 prefers nm , otherwise, it 
prefers N . 
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Thus, we conclude that given cm τββ > , if 
*> mm ββ , the equilibrium is ( nm , M ), 
otherwise, it is ( N , M ).  
 
Proof of Proposition 8.  
Proof. To prove firm 2's dominant strategy is C  when mc βτβ 2> , we need to show that given 
firm 1 choosing N , nc , and nm , firm 2 is better off choosing C  over M :   
• When firm 1 chooses N , we need to show for firm 2, ** > MC ππ  in all cases. Since 
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Cπ  is 
increasing in cτβ  (proven in the proof of Proposition 7), if 
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Thus, this inequality holds for all 
2
<0 kmβ≤ . 
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βπ . Therefore, 
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Notice that *Nπ  is decreasing in cτβ  for kc <τβ , and 
*
ncπ  is monotonous and increasing in 
cτβ . When 0=cτβ , 9
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 Thus, we conclude that given mc βτβ 2> , if 
*> cc βτβ , the equilibrium is ( nc , C ), 
otherwise, it is ( N , C ).  
 
Proof of Proposition 9.  
Proof. If mc βτβ > , considering the interior solutions requires condition (14), which implies that 
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− . *hlπ  in the interior solution of the hl  case is 
clearly lower than *Hπ  in the single-service case. Thus, the interior solution of the hl  business 
model is not optimal. Also, *allπ  in the interior solution of the all  business model is lower 
than *nhπ  in the case of the mixed business model. Thus, the interior solution of the all  
business model cannot be optimal. 
If cm τββ ≥  and 0<)2(1 ck τβα −− , condition (14) for the interior solution cannot be 
satisfied; therefore, only the corner solutions are feasible. In the case of the hl  business model, 
the corner solutions are equivalent to either of the single-service ad-supported business models 
( H  and L ). In the case of the all  business model, the corner solutions are equivalent to the 
mixed business models ( nh  and nl ). Therefore, offering both CPC and CPM ad-supported 
services is not optimal.  
 
Proof of Proposition 10.  
Proof.   
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Parameters and Decision Variables 
Notation   Definition   Comment 
r   Consumers' reservation value of 
the ad-free service  
Consumers have homogeneous reservation 
value 
θ   Consumer ad sensitivity  Consumers differ in their sensitivity toward 
ads: [0,1]~ Uθ  
k   Consumers' disutility from ads  Consumers who are more sensitive to ads 
experience a higher reduction in utility, kθ ; 
also, rk < .  
N, M, C Subscripts to prices and 
revenues; M and C are also 
subscripts to ad revenue rates 
N denotes the ad-free service, M the CPM 
ad-supported service, and C the CPC 
ad-supported service; N, M, and C are 
capitalized to refer to the single-service 
business model, where only one of three 
services is offered.  
n, m, c Subscripts to prices and 
revenues; m and c are also 
subscripts to ad revenue rates 
Similarly, they denote the ad-free service, 
the CPM-based, and the CPC-based 
services, respectively; however, these are 
lower-case letters to represent services 
offered in a mixed business model with two 
or more services. 
mβ , cβ  Ad revenue rate for the CPM or 
CPC model 
In the CPM case, ad revenues are 
proportional to service demand, whereas in 
the CPC case, they depend on consumers’ 
ad sensitivity. 
τ   Ad click rate parameter  Adjustment from consumers’ ad sensitivity 
to the clicking probability, and (0,1)∈τ .  
Np , np ,
Cp , cp ,
Mp , mp  
Price of the ad-free service, the 
CPC-based ad-supported 
service, or the CPM-based 
ad-supported service  
In a mixed business model, services can be 
offered at different prices, which are 
represented separately with the 
corresponding subscripts. 
Nπ , Cπ ,
Mπ , ncπ ,
nmπ  
Revenues of the service 
provider with any of the 
single-service or mixed 
business models 
In a mixed business model, the revenue 
accounts for the total revenues from all 
types of services offered. 
 
Table 2: Monopolist's Optimal Price and Revenue Under Single-Service Business Models 
 
Service Type   Optimal Price   Optimal Revenue 
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Table 3: Monopolist's Optimal Price and Revenue Under Mixed Business Models 
 
Service Types   Optimal Prices   Optimal Revenue 
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Table 4: Duopoly Equilibrium Results Under Single-Service Business Models (B1) 
 
Revenue Model of Firm 2's Ad-Supported Service 
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Table 5: Duopoly Equilibrium Results Under Mixed Business Models (B2) 
 
Revenue Model of Firm 2's Ad-Supported Service 
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Table 6: Optimal Price and Revenue under Single-Service Business Models for the Alternative 
Model Setup (Appendix) 
   
Service Type   Optimal Price   Optimal Revenue 
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Figure 1: Monopolist's Optimal Business Model 
 
 
Figure 2: Duopoly Payoff Matrix for Cases A, B1, and B2 
 
Figure 3: Comparison of Price Stability Results 
 
Figure 4: Reduced Duopoly Payoff Matrix 
 
 
